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The measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) protocol is proposed
to remove the detector side channel attacks, while its security relies on the assumption that the
encoding systems are perfectly characterized. In contrast, the MDI-QKD protocol based on the
Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt inequality (CHSH-MDI-QKD) weakens this assumption, which only
requires the quantum state to be prepared in the two-dimensional Hilbert space and the devices are
independent. In experimental realizations, the weak coherent state, which is always used in QKD
systems due to the lack of an ideal single photon source, may be prepared in the high-dimensional
space. In this paper, we investigate the decoy-state CHSH-MDI-QKD protocol with s(3 ≤ s ≤ 5)
intensities, including one signal state and s − 1 decoy states, and we also consider the finite-size
effect on the decoy-state CHSH-MDI-QKD protocol with five intensities. Simulation results show
that this scheme is very practical.
Introduction - In principle, quantum key distribution
(QKD) [1] allows two distant legitimate parties Alice and
Bob to share unconditional secret keys, even in the pres-
ence of an eavesdropper Eve. Nevertheless, practical im-
plementations of QKD systems are usually composed of
imperfect devices, which makes it vulnerable to be at-
tacked by Eve [2–6]. To avoid all possible loopholes ex-
isting in real-life QKD systems, the device-independent
QKD (DI-QKD) protocol [7] is proposed, whose secu-
rity relies on the violation of the Clauser-Horne-Shimony-
Holt (CHSH) inequality [8]. However, DI-QKD is im-
practical with current technology due to the require-
ment of near-unity detection efficiency and low channel
loss. To avoid the detection loophole problem caused
by the channel losses, DI-QKD with a local Bell test
has been proposed [9], but it cannot overcome the de-
tection loophole problem caused by the limited detection
efficiency. Instead of DI-QKD, the measurement-device-
independent QKD (MDI-QKD) protocol [10, 11] was pro-
posed to remove all detector side channel attacks. Re-
cently, some experimental demonstrations of MDI-QKD
have been performed [12–15] and thus MDI-QKD has
proved to be practical.
However, the security of MDI-QKD relies on the as-
sumption that the encoding systems are fully charac-
terized. To further improve the security of MDI-QKD,
several protocols have been proposed [16–18] to relax
its assumptions on the encoding systems. Inspired by
the spirit of DI-QKD, the MDI-QKD protocol based on
the CHSH inequality (CHSH-MDI-QKD) [18] has been
proposed to weaken the assumption of state prepara-
tion in MDI-QKD. Interestingly, CHSH-MDI-QKD can
overcome the detection loophole problem existing in DI-
QKD. It should be noted that CHSH-MDI-QKD requires
the state to be prepared in the two-dimensional Hilbert
space, and Alice’s (Bob’s) devices are independent of
Eve’s. In the CHSH-MDI-QKD protocol, its state prepa-
ration can be assumed to be a black box only with a
dimension restriction.
The weak coherent state source, which has a Pois-
son distribution of photon numbers, is used to imple-
ment the CHSH-MDI-QKD protocol due to the lack of
an ideal single photon source. The nonzero probabil-
ity of multi-photon pulses in the weak coherent state,
which is equivalent to the high-dimensional state prepa-
ration, can bring the photon-number-splitting (PNS) at-
tack [19, 20] to CHSH-MDI-QKD. Hence, the decoy-state
method [21, 22] is adopted to combat the multi-photon
events in the weak coherent state. In this Brief Report,
we investigate the decoy-state CHSH-MDI-QKD protocol
with s(3 ≤ s ≤ 5) intensities (including one signal state
and s − 1 decoy states) to estimate the yield and the
CHSH value of single-photon contributions, and we also
consider the finite-size effect on the decoy-state CHSH-
MDI-QKD protocol with five intensities. The simulation
results show that our scheme is very promising and can
be applied to real-life QKD systems.
Decoy-state CHSH-MDI-QKD protocol - Let Alice and
Bob use weak coherent states as their sources. Let the
predetermined intensity set of Alice (Bob) be µ (ν),
where µ (ν) has ma (mb) different intensities denoted
as µ0, µ1, · · · , µma−1 (ν0, ν1, · · · , νmb−1). Alice prepares
her states in the basis set {A1, A2}, and Bob prepares
his states in the basis set {B0, B1, B2}. Note that the
security of CHSH-MDI-QKD does not rely on the details
of the basis sets, provided that all the bases are in a
two-dimensional Hilbert space. For a real-life implemen-
tation, we can assume that A1 = Z, A2 = X , B0 = Z,
2B1 =
−Z−X√
2
, and B2 =
Z−X√
2
, where Z = |0〉 〈0| − |1〉 〈1|,
and X = |0〉 〈1| + |1〉 〈0|. Assume the state preparation
and measurement devices are independent, which can be
satisfied in practical scenarios. The decoy-state CHSH-
MDI-QKD protocol [18] runs as follows:
(1) Alice randomly chooses a basis from {Z,X}, a bit
from {0, 1}, and an intensity from µ, and sends
the corresponding weak coherent state pulse to the
third untrusted party, Eve. Bob randomly chooses
a basis from {Z, −Z−X√
2
, Z−X√
2
}, a bit from {0, 1},
and an intensity from ν, and sends the correspond-
ing state to Eve.
(2) Considering Alice’s states in {Z,X}, Bob’s states
in {−Z−X√
2
, Z−X√
2
}, and Eve’s measurement of the
projection into the Bell state |ψ−〉 = 1√
2
(|HV 〉 −
|VH〉), Alice and Bob denote the results as S1.
Similarly, considering Alice’s states in Z, Bob’s
states in Z, and Eve’s measurement of the projec-
tion into the Bell states |ψ+〉 = 1√
2
(|HV 〉+ |V H〉)
and |ψ−〉 = 1√
2
(|HV 〉 − |V H〉), Alice and Bob de-
note the results as S2. Note that, in S2, Alice or
Bob should flip her or his bits so that their bit
strings are correctly correlated.
(3) Alice and Bob estimate the CHSH value g11 of
single-photon contributions according to S1, and
estimate the yield Y ZZ11 of single-photon contribu-
tions according to S2, where S1 and S2 consist of
all combinations of Alice’s and Bob’s intensities.
Then, they perform key reconciliation and privacy
amplification to get final secret keys.
Theoretically, after the quantum communication
phase, Alice and Bob can get a series of decoy-state equa-
tions which can be expressed as
QZZµkνl =
∑∞
m,n=0
Pµkνlmn Y
ZZ
mn , (1)
∑1
i,j=0
aijY
ij,w
µkνl
=
∑∞
m,n=0
Pµkνlmn
∑1
i,j=0
Y ij,wmn C
w
mn,
(2)
and
∑1
i,j=0
Y ij,wµkνl =
∑∞
m,n=0
Pµkνlmn
∑1
i,j=0
Y ij,wmn , (3)
where µk (νl) is the intensity of Alice’s (Bob’s) weak
coherent state source, m (n) denotes that Alice (Bob)
sends out a weak coherent pulse with m (n) photons,
i (j) is the eigenstate in Alice’s (Bob’s) basis, ZZ de-
notes the combination of Alice’s basis Z and Bob’s ba-
sis Z, w is the combination of Alice’s and Bob’s basis
(w ∈ {Z−Z−X√
2
, X −Z−X√
2
, X Z−X√
2
, Z Z−X√
2
}, for simplic-
ity, which is also denoted as w ∈ {QS,RS,RT,QT }
in the same sequence [25]), aij is the constant param-
eter (a00 = 1, a01 = −1, a10 = −1, a11 = 1), P
µkνl
mn
is the probability of Alice sending out m photons with
the intensity µk and Bob sending out n photons with
the intensity νl, Y
ij,w
µkνl
is the yield of the eigenstates i
and j with the intensities µk and νl in the basis com-
bination w, Y ij,wmn is the yield of the eigenstates i and j
with the photons m and n in the basis combination w,
QZZµkνl =
1
4
∑1
i,j=0 Y
ij,ZZ
µkνl
, Y ZZmn =
1
4
∑1
i,j=0 Y
ij,ZZ
mn , and
Cwmn = (
∑1
i,j=0 aijY
ij,w
mn )/(
∑1
i,j=0 Y
ij,w
mn ).
As suggested in [23, 24], without loss of security and
accuracy, there is no need to consider an infinite number
of unknown parameters in Eqs.(1)–(3). Using the lin-
ear programming method [23, 24], Alice and Bob can
easily estimate the lower bound of Y ZZ11 according to
Eq.(1). To get the lower bound of g11 (g11 = C
QS
11 +
CRS11 + C
RT
11 − C
QT
11 ), they need to estimate the upper
bound of CQT11 and the lower bound of C
QS
11 , C
RS
11 , and
CRT11 according to Eqs.(2)–(3). For example, as shown
in [23, 24], to get the upper bound of CQT11 , they di-
vide the upper bound of
∑1
i,j=0 Y
ij,QT
11 C
QT
11 with the
lower bound of
∑1
i,j=0 Y
ij,QT
11 . Similarly, to get the
lower bound of CQS11 (C
RS
11 or C
RT
11 ), they divide the
lower bound of
∑1
i,j=0 Y
ij,QS
11 C
QS
11 (
∑1
i,j=0 Y
ij,RS
11 C
RS
11
or
∑1
i,j=0 Y
ij,RT
11 C
RT
11 ) with the upper bound of∑1
i,j=0 Y
ij,QS
11 (
∑1
i,j=0 Y
ij,RS
11 or
∑1
i,j=0 Y
ij,RT
11 ). With
the estimated parameters, the final key rate is given by
[11, 18, 23]
R ≥ Pµsνs11 Y
ZZ
11 (1 − log2(1 +
√
2−
g2
11
4
))
−QZZµsνsfh(E
ZZ
µsνs
)
, (4)
where µs (νs) denotes the intensity of Alice’s (Bob’s)
signal state, f is the key reconciliation efficiency, EZZµsνs
denotes the error rate with intensities µs and νs in ZZ,
and h(x) = −xlog2(x) − (1− x)log2(1− x).
Simulation - Assume that the dark count rate of the
single photon detector is 6×10−6, the detection efficiency
of the single photon detector is 14.5%, the loss coefficient
of the quantum channel is 0.2 dB/km, and the key recon-
ciliation efficiency is 1.16. For simplicity and without loss
of generality, we only consider the measurement of the
projection into the Bell state |ψ−〉 = 1√
2
(|HV 〉 − |V H〉)
for the CHSH-MDI-QKD protocol and the MDI-QKD
protocol.
Using these parameters, we investigate the decoy-state
CHSH-MDI-QKD protocol and the decoy-state MDI-
QKD protocol. For the decoy-state CHSH-MDI-QKD
protocol with three, four, and five intensities, the in-
tensities of the decoy states are reasonably adopted as
{µ0 = ν0 = 0, µ1 = ν1 = 0.01}, {µ0 = ν0 = 0, µ1 =
ν1 = 0.01, µ2 = ν2 = 0.02}, and {µ0 = ν0 = 0, µ1 =
ν1 = 0.01, µ2 = ν2 = 0.02, µ3 = ν3 = 0.03}. For the
decoy-state MDI-QKD protocol with three and four in-
tensities, the intensities of the decoy states are the same
as the decoy-state CHSH-MDI-QKD with three and four
intensities. The signal state (µs = νs) is optimized by
searching with a step of 0.01 for all cases.
The simulation results of the two protocols in the
asymptotic case are presented in Fig.1, where the four
lines on the left are simulation results of the decoy-state
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FIG. 1: (Color online) Results of the decoy-state CHSH-MDI-
QKD protocol and the decoy-state MDI-QKD protocol with
different intensities in the asymptotic case. Note that D de-
notes the decoy states, and S denotes the signal state.
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
-10
-9
-8
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
lo
g 1
0R
Distance(km)
 N=1014
 N=1016
 N=1018
 No fluctuation
FIG. 2: (Color online) Results of the decoy-state CHSH-MDI-
QKD protocol with five intensities with statistical fluctuation.
CHSH-MDI-QKD protocol, and the three lines on the
right are the simulation results of the decoy-state MDI-
QKD protocol. The results show that the MDI-QKD
protocol with three and four intensities can achieve good
approximations of the infinite intensities case, while the
CHSH-MDI-QKD protocol with three and four intensi-
ties cannot, which can be explained by the fact that there
are more parameters to be estimated in CHSH-MDI-
QKD than in MDI-QKD using the linear programming
method. And CHSH-MDI-QKD with five intensities can
achieve a good approximation of the infinite intensities
case.
We also consider the finite-size effect on the decoy-state
CHSH-MDI-QKD protocol with five intensities, where
five standard deviations of fluctuation are used[22]. As-
sume that the pulse number of decoy states and the signal
states of Alice and Bob are the same, denoted by N . The
results are shown in Fig. 2. As illustrated in Fig. 2, the
secure key rate varies greatly with different pulse num-
bers. The secure distance with N = 1014 is more than
110 km.
Conclusion - In conclusion, the CHSH-MDI-QKD pro-
tocol weakens the assumption of state preparation in
MDI-QKD, and we have shown the feasibility of the
decoy-state CHSH-MDI-QKD protocol with three, four,
and five intensities. Especially, the decoy-state CHSH-
MDI-QKD protocol with five intensities can achieve a
good approximation of infinite intensities, which is very
promising and can be adopted to practical QKD systems
with current technology.
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